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The “commons dilemma” emerges in the natural resources literature as a
central metaphor for the pitfalls of joint decisionmaking. Its centrality
derives from the wide variety of cases in which external effects result from
interdependent choices over the use of natural resource stocks and flows.
Because of the universality of these problems, any framework that can supply
Insight into their nature is useful. Yet the structural simplicity of the
“commons dilemma” as It lS usually portrayed, notably by reference to the
“Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardln, 1968) or more formally as an n-person
Prisoners’ Dilemma game, obscures important and complex issues with which
economic theory is increasingly concerned. These include strategic choices
characterized by the absence of dominant strategies and unique equilibrium
outcomes; the treatment of external effects in relatlon to “missing markets”;
and the role of information in coordinating choices where the central analytical
and empirical Issue is expectations formation.
This paper has three basic purposes. The first is to review a rigorous
framework for the analysls of commons dilemmas proposed by Dasgupta that avoids
many basic faults of the usual apparatus. The second lS to relate this analysls
of the commons to models of external effects and publlc goods. Properly for-
mulated, the commons dilemma may be considered as a choice constrained by these
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external efiects, making it a problem of the “Second Best.” The third purpose
lS to extend the analysis into the literature on strategic interdependence,
especially problems In the economics of expectations formation. The paper
concludes with a general summary of the redirection implied for both theory
and emplrlcal research in natural resource economics.
1. Modeling the Commons
The “commons dilemma” arises from the simple observation that resources
managed Jointly are often used nonoptimally from the point of view of society
as a whole, even though choices respecting their use appear individually opti-
mal. In the literature on overgrazing, overforestlng, overpopulation,
overdrilllng for oil or water, and even overspending the budget, this dilemma
can be described as one of incompatibility between individual and collective
incentives. This “Incentive incompatibility” (see Hurwicz, 1972) results in
nonPareto-optimal outcomes. Perhaps the most vivid description of this problem
1/ In the modern literature- 1s Garret Hardlnls widely cited article, “The Tragedy
of the Commons” (1968). Hardln writes:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the
commons ... As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to
maximize hls gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less con-
sciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me of adding one
more animal to my herd?l ... Adding together the component
partial utilitles, the rational herdsman concludes that the
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal
to his herd. And another; and another ... But this is the con-
clusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons. Therein 1s the tragedy. Each man is locked into a
system that compels hlm to increase his herd without limlt --
in a world that 1s limlted. Ruin is the destination toward
which all men rush, each pursuing hls own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom
Ln the commons brings ruin to all (p. 1244).Partha Dasgupta has




that “It would be difficult to
and fame containing as many errors
as the one above*”(1982, p. 13). These errors are partly omissions. As
Dasgupta notes, although commonly used resources may well be overexploited, it
is not because adding more cattle to the herd IS costless, even to the indivi--
dual herder. Nor can we know how costly such actions will be, either to the
individual or to society, without additional information. In fact, freedom in
the commons may not bring ruin to all. It may ruin some -- or none. These are
issues that bear closely on the provision of collective goods, the size of the
group making the collective consumption choice, and their selectlve incentives
to do so (Olson, 1965).
There are also more serious analytical difficulties with Hardin’s
analysis. These errors of commission are best seen in the argued equivalence
between “tragedy” and the almost equally well-known Prlsonersl Dilemma game,
widely used to describe the problem of collective consumption choices and the
Incentive to free ride. The difficulties with this approach (see Runge, 1981;
1982; 1984a) have led to a search for more complex and realistic models, notably
an iterated or repeated Prisonersf Dilemma, in which dominant strategies to free
ride break down, and ‘*tragedy”may be avoided through voluntary cooperation
(Barry, 1965; Taylor, 1976; HardIn, 1982; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
Because this discussion i,s widely familiar, it need not be repeated In
detail, except to note that even in its iterated form, the Prisonersl Dilemma
“is not rich enough to capture a useful abstraction of human affairs” (Shubik,
1970, p. 190). The essence of the single-period Prisonerst Dilemma iS that in
each period, a unique non-cooperative, Pareto-inferior (Nash) equilibrium is
sustained by dominant free rider strategies. Dominant strategies make expec-4
tations of othersr actions irrelevant, obviating the necessity
tations or gaining information about these actions. Yet it is
of forming expec-
precisely the
Interdependence and jointness of the commons that make expectations of others’
behavior so crucial to a resolution of the problem. In its iterated form, it
is the question of expectations over time that makes the repeated Prisonersf
Dilemma a more plausible model than the single period game.
What is Implied by Hardin’s classic article and mistakenly described by the —
Prisonersl Dilemma (although partially corrected In its iterated form) is that
each of the agents using a common pool resource could benefit if they jointly
were to exercise some control over the common (Dasgupta, 1982, p. 14). This
Joint control nwt be based on cooperative contingent strategies, which in turn
depend on correctly predicting and evaluating the likely strategies of others
(Runge, 1984a). The key issues, therefore, are how such joint decisions are
informed, what factors constrain them, and how they are enforced. In order to
clarify these issues, a model lS required that recognizes the joint nature of
common resource decisions, as well as the role of expectations arising from the
interdependence of individual choice.
Consider a case of N identical users of a common property resource, in
which each agent, in the course of production, imposes a negative external
2/
effect in the form of damages on the others sharing the common.- Assume that
the only way to reduce this negative external effect is to reduce production
output (e.g., by “stinting” on cattle grazed, reducing fishing or foresting
effort, drilling fewer wells, etc.). Intertemporal elements may be
into the model (e.g., Dasgupta, 1982, pp. 150-177). Here, however,
distinctions between stocks and flows. Let yi denote the output of








If we measure this external effect in such a way that a = 1, we can
simply Identify Zi and yi. In addition, assume that the share of collective
benefits, not includlng external effects, that agent i enJoys when It pro-
duces yi is given by the function B(yi). This includes the cost of producing
Y~ , so that we can describe this benefits function as rising with increases
in yi up to a point, then falling as the costs of production increase, as in




The negative externality also leads to reductions in total output. This
loss can be described for each agent by the damage function
where ~ yi .s total output and the ,dentxty defined for Zi and yi above holds.
~=1
This damage is a positive function of total output, as in Figure 2.
0
FIGURE 2 ; Y,
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With this apparatus, we may define the non-cooperative outcome loosely
referred to in the literature as a “tragedy.** A given agent i, assuming that
each of the other agents will produce a given amount, say y, concludes that
net social benefits (includ~ng losses from external effects) would be
(1) B(Yi) - D(yi + (N - l)y).7
Since agent i can only choose yi, he takes y as given, and maximizes his own
net benefit. Maximizing (1) by taking first order conditions yields agent its
“’individualisticbenefit cost rule.”
2B(yi) 2[D(yi + (N - l)y]
(2) —=
aYf aY~
Since the agents are assumed Identical, if yi is individually optimal for
agent i It is also optimal for the other (N - 1) agents and defines an
equilibrium in which yi = y. Equation (2) can, therefore, be expressed
equivalently as
where Y = Ny. A unique non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium value exists
for the unknown quantity y which we may call ~. Total output is thus N?
at this equilibrium, where each agent equates marginal benefits from
production with marginal costs due to the negative external effects of this
production.
The “tragedy” is that following the individualistically optimal
benefit cost rule is collectively nonoptimal. This is shown by the fact
that the sum of individual
given by (3). Rather, the
(4) NB(y) - ND(Ny)
benefits is not maximized by following the rule
collective maximum is given by8
Taking first order conditions with respect to y where Y = Ny, yields a
“collective benefit-cost rule.”
This expression equates the marginal benefits to a representative agent from
increases in output with the sum of marginal damages to each agent. It is
simply a form (for public “bads”) of the expression for the optimal supply of
public goods (Samuelson, 1954). If Y* is the solution to (5), then inspection
of (3) indicates that y > y*. The incentives described by the individualistic
benefit cost rule yieldlng ~ are thus incompatible with those described by the
collective benefit cost rule. In the absence of a joint strategy in which out-
put is reduced each agent will produce too much despite the fact that all agents
are collectively better off producing at level y*. This result is shown graphi-
cally in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 \9
It must be emphasized that this outcome is not formally equivalent to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, principally because it is not characterized by dominant
strategies for each agent (Dasgupta, pp. 23-24). As noted elsewhere (Runge,
1981), the Prisonerst Dilemma game leads not only to a unique non-cooperative
Nash outcome that lS Pareto lnefflcient, but also depends on the dominance of
free rider strategies to sustain this equilibrium. In equation (3), by contrast,
~ 1s the best strategy for an individual agent lf and only lf the remaining
agents produce negative external effects equal to (N - l);. Hence, the decision
of each agent is contingent on the expectation that other agents w1ll act in a
particular way. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, by contrast, expectations are simply
irrelevant; It I.Salways optimal to produce too much and free ride no matter
what others do. If an agreement can be reached in which each agent expects
others to produce at level y*, there is no reason to suppose that overproduction
w1ll occur. Such an agreement, however, requires the assurance that agents’
ex ante expectations of the actions of others will be realized, ex post. With
this assurance, “tragedy” 1s not inevitable, and is, in fact, entirely
avoidable.
This result IS broadly consistent with the findings of Comes and Sandier
(1983), who have argued on theoretical grounds that Nash behavior IS an
inappropriate basis for modeling common property (see also Runge, 1984a).
Depending on whether agents expect that others w1ll either overexplolt or
underexploit a common property resource m reaction to ones’ own behavior, the
commons may be more or less ‘“tragic”than the Nash equilibrium described above.
Comes and Sandier argue, however, that in the absence of fixed costs and
barriers to entry, additional firms (even two) w1ll be led to overexploltation.
It IS precisely the “role of Instltutlonal agreements to fix these costs, Impose10
barriers to entry, and establish “expectations contours” for the agents sharing
the comalons. With such agreements, overexploitation is not inevitable.
Hence, “tragedy” 1s avoidable in cases of common property externalities,
so long as agreements can be structured that coordinate the expectations of
lndlvldual agents according to a rule that takes account of collective
welfare. Before explorlng the properties of such rules, It IS useful to
consider in more detail the llnks from the analysls above to the literature
on public goods and problems of the “Second Best.”11
II. The Commons, Publlc Goods, and
External Constraints
The relationship between common property and the more general issues of
publlc goods and externalities is often mentioned, yet not rigorously explored.
It was noted above that the asymmetry m commons dilemmas between individual and
collective decisions takes the form of the classlcal distinction between private
and public choices first developed by Samuelson (1954). The indlvldualistlc
benefit cost rule differs from the collective benefit cost rule because the
collective rule lS derived from maxlmlzatlon of the vertical sum of benefits for
all agents, whereas the lndlvlduallstlc rule IS derived from maximization of the
horizontal sum. This distinction arose in the context of externalltles, empha-
sizing the close slmllarlty between commons dilemmas, publlc goods and external
effects. Demonstrating this similarity requires further analysls.
The commons dilemma lS a case of negative external effects in which
these effects fall Jointly on members of the group that shares the commons.
The negative effects are, therefore, collective bads. These bad effects
upset the mechanism that would lead to a Pareto-optimal allocation based
on lndlvlduallstic benefit cost rules, creating the classical divergence
between private and social welfare. The external effect or (equivalently)
the collective bads borne by users of the commons represent a constraint on
the capacity of users to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation. By constraining
the choice of these agents, they alter first-order conditions for optimization,
resultlng In a problem of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-57),
So long as the individualistic benefit cost rules contain these effects,12
the commons dilemma must be addressed as a problem of strategically interdepen-
dent choice.
Returning to the model above, let F1 represent the production function
of a given agent In the commons, of the form
(6) FI = (X:, x;, X?, ... . X:; yi~l)
where the X1
23
1, ‘1‘ ‘1’ ““” x: are m inputs to agent 1’s production and yl#l IS
the external effect of the production decisions of all other agents on agent 1.
Where this effect 1s negative, we may define it as the cost in foregone output
resultlng from joint use of the commons. What we need to emphasize is that In
the short run, without some agreement regulating or eliminating the term
yl#l from agent lls production function, the external effect must simply be
taken as given. It 1s not a control variable for agent 1. Its presence defines
an externality arlslng from Joint use of the commons, in which the effects on
total output cannot be excluded by an agent acting individually. We may, there-
fore, define a particular level of the external effect as a constraint on the
production posslblllties of agent 1, such that the lndlvidualls maximization
problem takes the form:
~l(Pj w; Y=#l) ~ Max p l F (x . 1 1’ yi#l) ‘w “ ‘1
x
where IT ~ 1s the first individual’s profit, p is a vector of output prices, w is
a vector of input prices, and x~ a vector of agent lls Inputs. The existence of
the external effect alters the marginal conditions for optimization and is a
distortion or “deviation” leadlng to a Second Best problem. Typically, the ana-
lysls of common property assumes that the marginal conditions for optimization
are negatively affected by the existence of the externality, and that output13
moves away from Pareto-optlmality. However, there is no basis in theory for
arguing that this is always so. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests numerous
examples in which common property may not lead to Pareto-relevant constraints on
production (see Runge, 1984b). Moreover, the General Theory of the Second Best
Implles that solutlons to the optimization problem above w1ll generally be dif-
ferent from those that solve the problem In the absence of external effects,
e.g. as under a fully privatlzed arrangement. In other words, optimization
results derived from the case in which Pareto-relevant external effects are
absent by deflnltlon due to full privatization are appropriate in the com-
mons, lf joint use is unavoidable and Pareto-relevant externalities are present
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-57). This point has wide-ranging PO1lCY relevance,
since it lmplles that common property arrangements require a different set of
Information for optimal declslons than private property arrangements. As
Bromley notes, if the institutional structure changes then the ablllty even to
compare one set of Institutions with another according to the Pareto
1s threatened (Bromley, 1982).
Suppose that the externality IS relevant and negatively affects
individual’s optimization problem, so that
crlterlon
The consequence IS that agent 1 is motivated as a result of the negative exter-
nal effect to make some effort to modify the actions of the other (N-1) agents
by alleviating the current constraint on production. In the short run, the
value to agent 1 of making this effort is simply agent 1’s shadow price for the
external effect, or Al. This shadow value describes the “payoff” to changes
leadlng to reductions In the negative external effecc. This payoff is, of14
course, not a market price. Indeed, the fact that the effect g~ving rise to
this payoff is external suggests that such a market is missing. Nonetheless,
the relatlve size of this payoff is a direct and Increasing function of the
negative effect resultlng from the collective “bads” borne as a consequence of
the current institutional or technological arrangement. The higher is Al, the
greater the lncentlve of agent 1 (and, where agents are identical, other agents
as well) to innovate rules of resource use leadlng to reductions in these nega-
tive external effects. These innovations may include new property rights
arrangements, alternative technologies, or other changes (see Hayaml and Ruttan,
forthcoming, 1985). It should be observed that optimal solutions in both the
short and long run may well involve retention of a structure of joint use.
Here, I have distinguished between the short run, during wh~ch the
external effect is not a control variable, and the long run, in which the exter-
nal effect may be mltlgated through endogenous technical and/or Institutional
innovations. In the short run, in other words, technology and property rights
are f~xed. In the long run, the shadow value associated with the externality,
especially where large, creates incentives to renovate both new technology and
new property rights. In the case of individual utlllty functions, an analogous
argument can be made concerning the endogeneity of tastes, in which people
“learn to Ilve with” the externality and can eventually become Indifferent to
It (see Von Welzsacker, 1971).
Numerous technological innovations may be direct responses to the
constraints imposed by external effects n common pool resources, including, for
example, water filtration and sewage treatment devices for individuals utillzing
a common water source. In the short run, water pollution constitutes a collec-
tive bad that can seriously constrain productive actlvlty. This constraint15
raises the payoff to innovations such as sewage treatment, eventually Uking
collective action rational to overcome the bad by the installation of a public
good.~1 There are also a wide variety of institutional alternatives that may be
innovated In such cases, such as the development of a water authority to regu-
late use, fine polluting actlvlty, and so forth. Ultimately, Judgments over
the optlmality of these innovations depend on ex ante estimates of the marginal
benefits derived from eliminating the external effect (measured by Al) compared
with the marginal costs of the information, time, or transactions required to do
so. The general Implication of this analysis 1s that common property exter-
nalities are really constraints imposed by agents on one another, the alle-
viation of which can occur -- at a (shadow) price. This shadow price is a form
of non-market signal lndlcatlng the marginal benefits of alleviating the exter-
nal effect.
This analysis of common property externalities is formally equivalent to
the problem of collective bads (goods). The only difference between the exter-
nal effect and the publlc bad or good 1s the number of agents affected (see
Mishan, 1971, pp. 11-14). h IS well known, for private goods marginal rates of
substitution are revealed In the market, and are thus equal to the ratio of
prices. In the case of “pure” public bads or goods, in the short run agents
cannot adJust levels of consumption or (equivalently) adjust the level of exter-
nal effects. This lack of flexibility eliminates the price mechanism as a basis
for Pareto-optimal allocations of public goods, and also suggests that public
goods are simply a special case of the constraint associated with an external
effect (Mlshan, 1971).
A further observation lS that just as negative external effects in the
short run may lead to incentives for institutional or technical innovations16
in the long run, so will the existence of public bads. The more widespread
negative effects with high individual shadow values, the more “publlc” they
become, and the greater the collective incentive to allevlate them. In either
case, the Second Best nature of the optimization problem implies that market
prices are an insufficient signallng device leadlng to such innovations.
A richer information set of the sort contained in the partial derivative Xl
above 1s needed, because a market for the external effect itself is missing.17
III. Information and Expectations in th=eCommons
I would now llke to turn to the nature of the information set leadlng to
individual choices in the context of common property externalltzes. If external
effects can be understood as resultlng from the constraints agents Impose on
each other, then the theory of the Second Best suggests that non-price infor-
mation concerning the nature of these effects is required in order to allevlate
them. Information concerning the llkely actions of other agents WI1l be
necessary to determine the solutlon to the optlmlzatlon problem arlslng from
JOlnt use itself.
Baumol has argued (1976) that lt is impossible to lmaglne an external
effect that IS nonseparable In the sense that my optimal reaction to It 1s inde-
pendent of your actions and the actions of others in causing it. In order to
respond optimally, I need to have formulated an estimate of the effect yl#l = ~
so that I can base my response on this predicted behavior. In the short run,
this makes the problem of the commons one of pred~ctlon of the llkely actions of
others, since these actions are not “control variables.” In the long run, what
were not control variables become so as mstitutlonal and technical innovations
allow the actions of others to be controlled and therefore made more predic-
table. This estimation process may be described in terms of an expectations
formation problem.
The relationship between the nonseparabllity of choice, the problem of pre-
dlctlon, and the lack of dominant strategies was first shown by Davis and
Whlnston (1962). In the context of common property externalltles, this
relationship lS summarized by the statement that wherever external effects are
nonseparable, predictions regarding others’ actions Ieadlng to these effects are18
necessary data for optimal decisions. In a less general case than the one con-
sidered above, suppose two agents in a group use a common property resource.
F’roductlon functions for each take the general form described above, such Chat
(8) Fl = (x:, x;; y2)
1 where x and X2 again are inputs for both agent 1 and agent 2; y2 represents the
external effect of agent 21s production declslons on 1; and yl represents
the external effect of agent lls production declslons on 2. These effects





In the nonseparable case, the functions take a form such as that below,
where A and B are parameters, X1 ~ and x;




z and X2 are agent 2’s Inputs of the same factors of production. Let
1 [1
22
F1 = ‘lX1 - ‘1 Y2
1 [1
22
‘2 = ‘2X2 - ‘2 J’1
First order conditions for agent 1 and agent 2 are:
a Fl
—’Al a xl
- 2x;y2 = o19
The key result 1s simply that optimal allocations of factors such as X1 and
2
x cannot be made In the absence of information concerning the output decisions
of the other agents utlllzlng the commons, expressed by y2 and yl.
This information may be formally expressed In terms of a probability den-
s~ty function defined for each agent over the likely contributions of others to
the collective bad. E[y2] is the expected (mean) external effect contributed by
agent 2, and E[yl] is the expected (mean) external effect contributed by agent
1. More generally, E[yl#l] 1s the total external effect expected by agent 1
from all other agents sharing the commons. Surrounding these expectations IS
some uncertainty, defined as the variance and higher moments of y2 around E[y2],
the variance and higher moments of yl around E[yl] , etc.
Followlng Stlgler (1961), this lack of certainty about the expected exter-
nal effects of others measures the information each agent holds concerning these
actions. The more densely distributed the probability density function of
Y2 around E[Y21, the more certainty or.assurance each agent has about the llkely
actions of others, and the more well-defxned hls nonseparable decision problem
becomes. In the common property conte~t, therefore, the information contained
In the probabllxty distributions defining Joint actions has value precisely
because they allow (Second-Best) optimal declslons to be defined for each agent
sharing the commons.
The key point emerging from this analysis lS that common property exter-
nalities are directly related to expectations formation and the role of non-
prlce information In establishing these expectat~ons over time. This result has20
been explored In some detail In the literature on rational expectations fore-
casts. In the example above, a “rational expectations equilibrium” (in the
sense of Muth, 19bl) would result when each agent correctly assessed the llkely
behavior of other agents based on available information concerning the obJec-
tlve probability dlstrlbutlon of outcomes and the relevant, correct economic
theory. This forecast would lead, in turn, to a solutlon to the optimization
problem based on a correct estimate of the equilibrium value y.
Recent criticisms of the rational expectations assumption, which are
highly relevant to the common property case, emphasize the difficulties of
obtalnlng this forecast based on price Information alone. As Frydman and
Phelps (1983) observe, the key requirement determining the structure of Joint
expectations held by agents about one another is some form of “consensus
condltlon”. This consensus can only be achieved by social institutions that
“rationally solve the conjectural interdependence that cannot be left simply
to the rational expectations of individual agents” (LeiJonhufvud, 1983).
Common property externalities are thus fundamentally an institutional
issue, in which the relative capacity of Institutions to assure a particular
pattern of Joint action over time is of paramount importance. This assurance
a function of the relative success that different institutions achieve in
enforczng and maintaining consensus. This llnkage between nonseparable deci-
sions and the role of social lnstltutlons was anticipated by Marchand and
Russell’s (1973) analysis of liability rules and resource allocation, which
1s
showed that where externalities are nonseparable (as in the commons) the alloca-
tion of resources depends on the capacity of the legal framework to define
llablllty. This liability assignment is a central feature of institutional suc-
cess in the generation of a “consensus” concerning the likely actions of others.21
The central conclusion emerging from this analysis 1s that “commons
dilemmas” arise from the incapacity of lndlvlduals to coordinate their
expectations according to
The primary difficulty 1s
capacity either to reduce
rules that lead to collectively optimal outcomes.
in developing the lnstltutlonal or technical
the external effect resultlng from common use so that
lt M Pareto-Irrelevant, or to establlsh a basis for predicting this effect,
allowlng the Second Best optlmlzatlon problem to be solved. In either case,
there can be no presumption that either the price system or a unique institu-
tional prescription (e.g., private property rights) will lead to the solution to
this dilemma, unless such a structure of rights can be proven superior at coor-
dinating the expectations of the group sharing the commons.22
Iv. Conclusion: Future Directions for Research
I have argued that “commons dilemmas” arise from Incompatible individual
and group Incentives. ‘l’his Incompatiblllty is formally equivalent to the dif-
ferences between individual and collective rationality arising In cases of
public goods (here bads) which 1s In turn a special case of externality. When
the constraints Imposed by Interdependence are traced to their sources, they
raise basic questions concerning the information set held by agents sharing a
common resource, and the role of social lnstltutlons m establishing a consensus
over how these resources are used.
The consequences of this dilemma for natural resource economics are
several. First, it suggests a shift in attention at both the theoretical and
emplrlcal level toward lnstltutlonal analysls. The relatlve capacity of dif-
ferent resource regimes successfully to convey information to agents who depend
on -jointlyproduced outputs w1ll determine the relatlve efficiency with which
these outputs are produced. This raises anew fundamental Issues of the
appropriate level at which non-market decisions should be made, and the best way
in which to enforce these declslons over time. Second, it suggests the close
llnkages between several bodies of economic theory, notably those deallng with
externalltles? public goods, games, and uncertainty. These theoretical
approaches are united by the central role of expectations formation in non–
separable decision making. Rather than working to refine any one of them,
however, natural resource economics may profit from combining and synthesizing
them to suit actual problems. An Important role for the resource economist lS
to make economic analysls more relevant, as well as more rigorous. Finally, the
approach developed here suggests the central role of llablllty, and lmplles that
a theoretical framework (e.g., Cease, 1960) in which information costs play no23
role can be of only llmited utillty. The particular advantages of institutional
alternatives in efficiently and equitably allocating resources emerges from the
“commons dilemma” as the central problem for future research in natural resource
economics.24
Footnotes
1. It should be noted that the problem
early in Western civilization. In Polltlcs,
“that which IS common to the greatest number
it,” because “everyone thinks chiefly of hls
Interest.” Hobbes’ Leviathan results from a
was recognized by authors rather
for example, Plato observed:
has the least care bestowed on
own, hardly at all of the common




needed to overcome the anarchy resulting from purely Individualistic
Hume describes the dilemma In the Treatise of Human Nature in terms of
a common meadow, In which “each seeks a pretext to free himself of
the trouble and expense, and would lay the burden on others.” Rousseau
raises It in connection with a collective stag hunt that fails when a hunter




he cared very llttle about having caused hls companions to mss theirs.”
and other examples are discussed In Taylor (1976) and Hardln (1982).
most forceful modern exposition IS Mancur Olsonfs (1965), which explicitly
recalls Humels example. Other modern treatments outside the economics litera-
ture are Dawes (1980) and Edney (1980).
2. The exposition here follows Dasgupta (1982), although Figure 3 below
corrects a sllght error found In Dasgupta’s graphical exposition.
3. This collective lncentlve (reflected by the shadow value associated
with the constraint In the model above) 1s, of coulse, balanced by the
information and transactions costs of collective action as the group grows
In size. This IS the essential contribution made by Olson in hls classlc
1965 study.25
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